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Abstract
An impossibility theorem demonstrates that a particular problem or set of problems cannot be
solved as described in the claim. Such theorems put limits on what is possible to do concerning
artificial intelligence, especially the super-intelligent one. As such, these results serve as guidelines,
reminders, and warnings to AI safety, AI policy, and governance researchers. These might enable
solutions to some long-standing questions in the form of formalizing theories in the framework of
constraint satisfaction without committing to one option. In this paper, we have categorized
impossibility theorems applicable to the domain of AI into five categories: deduction,
indistinguishability, induction, tradeoffs, and intractability. We found that certain theorems are too
specific or have implicit assumptions that limit application. Also, we added a new result (theorem)
about the unfairness of explainability, the first explainability-related result in the induction category.
We concluded that deductive impossibilities deny 100%-guarantees for security. In the end, we give
some ideas that hold potential in explainability, controllability, value alignment, ethics, and group
decision-making. They can be deepened by further investigation.

"This, then, is the ultimate paradox of thought:
to want to discover something that thought itself cannot think."
S.Kierkegaard

1

Introduction

An impossibility theorem demonstrates that a particular problem cannot be solved as described in
the claim, or that a particular set of problems cannot be solved in general. The most well-known
general examples are Gödel’s Incompleteness theorems [1] and Turing’s undecidability results [2] in
logic and computability, as well as Fermat's Last Theorem in number theory. The similar, and
connected, is the notion of no-go theorems that state the physical impossibility of a particular
situation. These results, though in themselves do not point to the solutions, are useful in the sense
that they guide the direction for future efforts in AI in general, but in our case, the interest is in AI
safety and security. In physics, there is an idea of restating the whole field in the terms of
counterfactuals and what is possible and impossible in the system [3]. The authors think this will
enable solutions to some long-standing questions in the form of formalizing theories in the
framework of constraint satisfaction without committing to one option. A similar view regarding the
utilization of the constraint satisfaction approach to many questions in philosophy is expressed by
Wolpert [4]. Moreover, automated proof [5] and search [6] procedures for impossibility theorems
based on constraint satisfaction were already proposed in the domain of social choice theory.
First, we shall present a classification of all relevant impossibility results. In that classification, all
the impossibility theorems are shown to be neatly subsumed under the problems with capacity
disparity where several related objects differ in size. Then, we shall present the current impossibility
results that we find relevant for AI. That includes work made specifically in AI, but also work in
other fields such as mathematics, physics, economy, social choice theory, etc. In the process, we

shall show a new result - theorem that states the unfairness of explainability. It is the first induction
impossibility theorem pertaining to explainability as all the previous ones were addressing the
perspective of deduction.
Previous works cover similar topics within the scope of AI safety [7]–[10], but none focused on
impossibility theorems as a family, their utility, structure, and connections to other fields.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we introduce basic definitions. Section 3
contains the relevant work presented under newly defined categorization. In section 9 we focus on
impossibility theorems developed in the field of AI safety. The discussion is offered in section 13,
and ideas for future research are listed in section 14. Finally, we conclude the article in section 14.

2

Basic definitions

We shall not impose strict formalization, but we shall keep at the level of lawyerese in this paper to
ensure wide readability of material. Other papers will cover more formalized arguments. It is
evident that our investigation is done from the perspective of assumption that intelligent behavior
that can achieve its goals is computable.
System is any non-empty part of the universe.
State is the condition of the universe.
Control of system A over system B means that A can influence system B to achieve A’s desired
subset of state space.
Usually, with control, we aim at output controllability (from control theory). Such control is not
sufficient for safety – as we often make unsafe choices ourselves. Different modes of “influence”
and “desire” are possible. With regards to that, Yampolskiy in [7] mentions four types of control:
explicit (strict), implicit, aligned, and delegated. Explicit control agent takes expressed desires
literally and acts on them. Implicit control agent uses common sense as a safety layer over explicit
control to slightly reformulate the expressed desire and acts on it. Aligned control agent adds
intention inference over implicit control in order to postulate the intended desire and acts on it.
Delegated control agent decides for itself the subject’s desire that is long-term-best for the subject
and acts on it.
Intelligence is the ability for an information processing system to adapt to its environment with
insufficient knowledge and resources [11].
Safety of system A is the property of avoidance of going out of A’s desired subset of the state space.
Safety is pressed with finding the worst-case guarantees – which is modeled as adversarial games
that assume the ideal adversary.
Stability of state S for system A is the intrinsic tendency to return to A’s desired subset of state-space
after being perturbed.
Robustness of state S for system A is the property of staying within A’s desired subset of the state
space despite perturbations.
Catastrophic outcome for system A is any state from which the return to A’s desired subset of state
space is impossible.

Alignment within the ensemble of systems A1...An is the property that each system Ai achieves
greater than or equal benefit from working together than if any subset of agents acting selfinterestedly.
Alignment is about finding values that would make the game cooperative in a long term. There are
plenty of open questions regarding the topic of alignment. How to achieve cooperativity in game
over long periods? Is the game allowed to temporarily deviate from perfect cooperation? The
problem for humans is that we do not have consistent short- and long-term values. Sometimes we
have to suffer in short term (like in sports) in order to prosper in the long term. How to define
alignment with such preferences?

3

Impossibility theorems

Impossibility theorems boil down to some contradiction. The potential to find impossibility
theorems lurks at the appearance of paradoxes. Paradoxes are simple implications that there is some
constraint, limit, we were not aware of when we unknowingly reached out of the feasible area and
reaching some contradiction in our stated goals. Finding impossibility theorems circumscribes our
knowledge of possible which enables us to direct our efforts better and do better risk management.
These can help even when we do not know the status of final solutions, such as for AGI and AI
Safety, in a form of directing constraint satisfaction search – both in formalizing ideas and
committing to certain hypotheses. It might be that this is the most prudent approach for approaching
hard problems with long horizons to finding solutions. It works on a meta-level of scientific
investigation by upending the way research is done, in the process creating results about the
problem even when oblivious about the actual solution.

3.1

Capacity

Impossibility theorems pertinent to AI are mostly related to the problem of capacity disparity.
Namely, intuitively we operate between the domains that differ in size. For example, when
expanding from intrinsically smaller to a greater domain, or in the opposite direction when
contracting from bigger to the smaller domain. We have organized all the impossibility theorems
into 5 subcategories (see Figure 1):
1. Deduction (D),
2. Induction (I),
3. Indistinguishability (N),
4. Tradeoffs (T), and
5. Intractability (P).

Figure 1. Proposed categorization of impossibility theorems in AI
For example, deduction tries to go beyond its size capacity by going from countable to uncountable
infinite (Turing’s computability), in Gödel's terms by going from provable to true statements, or in
Chaitin’s terms from lower to greater Kolmogorov complexity of formal systems. Self-referential
paradoxes go beyond these capacity limits by including itself in its own definition and negating
itself. From that follows an infinite fractal-like growth where we used finite means to express
infinite without a fixed-point. Examples include unverifiability. The proofs in this category often
use Lawvere’s theorem [12], [13] in the disguise of Cantor’s diagonalization and liar’s paradox.
In terms of induction, we have to find a model within a (possibly infinite) set of plausible models
based on finite dataset/experience. Hence, we have the finite capacity of experience to guide our
search within a set having multitude (possibly infinitude) of elements. There are too many inductive
inferences that can be made. Induction as a general operation is prone to the problems emanating
from Hume's problem of induction and Goodman's new riddle of induction [14]. No Free Lunch
theorems [15], [16] deal with induction and are a formalization of Goodman's new riddle of
induction [17]. As such, they can be the basis of a vast number of induction-based impossibilities.
Examples include unpredictability.
Also, in special cases of induction, we have a problem of disentangling, ie. indistinguishability
(non-identifiability and unobservability). We wish to get the inner structure from the limited
entangled data. No amount of data can enable identification in the cases of non-injective
transformations that produced the data. This means the impossibility of learning even in the limit.
There is an inevitable loss of information going from the origin through the (capacity reducing)
transformation. That prohibits the recovery of full information and leads to observational
equivalence. Examples include unobservability in control theory [18].
Trade-offs are inherent to multicriteria decision making, or "you can't have it all". The problem of
size capacity is evident here in the inability to obtain the point with the individual maximal value of
each component at the Pareto front (and hence full hypervolume indicator [19]).
In intractability, we have physical limits on capacity (in memory, computing power,…) which
prohibits efficiently reaching solutions. This is not only a set-theoretical, computation-independent
limit, but it also enables relative comparisons, for example through Karp's hierarchy [20].

We have listed in Table 1, below, impossibility theorems we deemed important for for field of AI.
There are many more impossibility theorems in mathematics and physics, but they are not (to us)
evidently related to AI. There are also many impossibility theorems in machine learning, but we
omitted them due to the too-narrow scope.
Table 1. Impossibility theorems of interest to AI researchers.
Name

Source

Proven

Category
(D;I;N;T;P)

Unobservability

[18]

Y

N

Uncontrollability of
dynamical systems

[18], [21]

Y

N

Good Regulator
Theorem

[22]

Y

N

Law of Requisite
Variety

[23]

Y, under perfect information and
infinite speed

N

Informationtheoretical control
limits

[24]

Y

N

(Anti)codifiability
thesis

[25]–[27]

N

I

Arrows impossibility
theorem

[28]

Y

T

Impossibility theorems
in population ethics

[29]

Y

T

Impossibility theorems
in AI alignment

[30]

Y

T

Fairness impossibility
theorem

[31], [32]

Y

T

Limits on preference
deduction

[33]

Y

N

Rice's Theorem

[34]

Y

D

Unprovability

[1]

Y

D

Undecidability

[2], [35]

Y

D

Chaitin
Incompleteness

[36]

Y

D

Undefinability

[37]

Y

D

Unsurveyability

[38]

N

P

Unlearnability

[39], [40]
[41]

Y

D
P

Unpredictability of
rational agents

[42], [43]

Y

I

No Free Lunch supervised learning

[15]

Y

I

No Free Lunch -

[16]

Y

I

optimization
Free Lunch in
continuous spaces and
coevolutionary

[44], [45]

Y

I

Unidentifiability

[46]–[49]

Y

N

Physical limits on
inference

[4], [50], [51]

Y

D/I

Uncontainability

[52]

Y

D

Uninterruptibility

[53]–[57]

N, only under limited assumptions opened

D

Löb's Theorem
(unverifiability)

[58]

Y

D

Unpredictability of
superhuman AI

[59], [60]

Y~, definition of superhuman?

I

Unexplainability

[61]

N, based on explanation=proof &
(unprovability | undefinability),
assuming honesty or full model

D

Incomprehensibility

[61], [62]

N, based on explanation=proof &
(unverifiability | unsurveyability |
undefinability), assuming honesty or
full model

D

Y, comprehension=producing proof &
halting games
k-incomprehensibility

[63]

N, just definitions

I

Unverifiability

[64]

Y

D

Unverifiability of
robot ethics

[65]

Y

D

Intractability of
bottom-up ethics

[66], [67]

Y

P

Goodheart's Law
(Strathern)

[68], [69]

N

I

Campbell's law

[70]

N

I

Reward corruption
unsolvability

[71]

Y

I

Uncontrollability of AI

[7]

Y~, under degenerate conditions

D

Impossibility of
unambigous
communication

[72]

Y, under strict assumptions

I

Unfairness of
explanations

here

Y~, proof sketch

I

3.2

Deduction Impossibility Theorems

Limits of deduction are limits on our capability to achieve perfect certainty in facts. The vast
majority of listed results here use Lawvere’s fixed-point theorem [12], [13] as the basis of proofs,
i.e. more specifically a combination of Cantor’s diagonalization and liar’s paradox.
The most basic results here are Gödel’s incompleteness theorems [1] addressing unprovability and
Turing’s work [2] covering undecidability. In addition to the aforementioned which cover the
processing, Gregory Chaitin provided additional incompleteness results [36] that cover input sizes
measured by Kolmogorov’s complexity. Chaitin's incompleteness theorem states the existence of a
limit on any formal system to prove Kolmogorov complexity of strings beyond some length. There
are even conjectures that information complexity might be the source of incompleteness [36], [73]
whereby the theorems of finitely stated theories cannot be significantly more complex than the
theory itself.
Rice’s theorem [34] is a generalization of Turing’s undecidability of the halting property of
programs to any sufficiently complex property. This makes it an ideal tool for finding and proving
deduction limitations in AI, within its assumptions. Löb’s theorem [58], informally put, states that a
formal consistent system cannot, in general, prove its own soundness.
Regarding formal semantics, Tarski’s undefinability theorem [37] states that truth in a formal
system cannot be defined within that system. Measuring semantic information yield by deduction is
also poised by paradoxes. Bar-Hilel-Carnap paradox [74] in classical semantic information theory
entails that contradiction conveys maximal information. Hintikka’s scandal of deduction [75] points
to the fact that the information yield of truthful sentences is zero since their information is already
contained in the premises.
There is vast work in impossibility theorems in beliefs which is an extension of Gödel’s work.
Huynh and Szentes [76] have demonstrated irreconcilability between two notions of self-belief. In
[77], [78] the paradox of self-reference was extended to the games with 2 or more players which
yield impossible beliefs.
Inference devices covered in the series of papers by Wolpert [4], [50], [51] are an extension from
pure deductive systems to the general notion of inference devices which covers deduction, induction
(prediction, retrodiction), observation, and control while the device itself is embedded in a physical
universe. Additional limitations are found, both in a logical and stochastic sense. For example,
limits are found on strong and weak inference, control, self-control, and mutual control between the
two distinguishable devices. The limits are also put on prediction, retrodiction, observation, and
knowledge.

3.3

Indistinguishability Impossibility Theorems

Observability is the ability to infer the state of a black-box system from its input/output data.
Identifiability (ie. parameter and/or structural identifiability) is a special case of observability for
constant elements of the system whereby we only need to infer the values of those constant
elements. There are limits to both observability and identifiability, and the limits are caused by noninjective mappings [49] which inevitably lose information.
Identifiability and observability are important for the control over systems.
Controllability in control theory can be of two kinds: state and output. State controllability is the
ability to control the inner state of the system. Output controllability is the ability to control the
output of the system. State uncontrollability is the dual of unobservability. That is, state
controllability is impossible without observability [18], [21].

Good regulator theorem [22] relates output controllability and identifiability (modeling), but only
in a sense of optimal control, not sufficient control. It states that maximally simple among optimal
regulators must behave as an image of the controlled system under a homomorphism. Sufficiently
good regulators need not be optimal and the generalization of such theorem would be interesting.
Law of requisite variety [23] states that variety in outputs can only be reduced by the state
complexity of the controlling mechanism. Information theory state-control limit [24] says that
only up to information observed from the system can be used to reduce the entropy of the system.
In the absence of additional biases, general nonlinear independent component analysis has an
infinity of solutions that are indistinguishable [46]. Similar is shown for unsupervised learning of
disentangled representations [48]. There are also well-known non-identifiability limits to causal
discovery from the data [47].

3.4

Induction Impossibility Theorems

Limits on induction constrain our ability to infer latent factors. Here we will ignore the problem of
indistinguishability by just looking at equivalence classes of models indistinguishable in the limit.
In this case, there is a possibility to learn the true equivalence class asymptotically. But, given some
prefix of experience, there may be a multitude of candidate classes. This is pointed out in Hume’s
problem of induction and Goodman's new riddle of induction [14]. No free lunch theorems (NFL)
by Wolpert [15], [16] are the basic building blocks underlying the formalization of these limitations.
They were first formulated in general supervised learning and optimization, which were
subsequently unified through that framework. No free lunch theorems state that under uniform
distribution over induction problems, all induction algorithms perform equally [79]. At the heart of
NFL formalization is the independence of (search/learning) algorithm performance from the
uncertain knowledge of the true problem at hand. That independence is materialized in the inner
product formula of those two in describing the probability of attaining a performance value over the
unknown problem. There are, however, free lunches if more structure is imposed on the problem,
i.e. “there is no learning without bias, there is no learning without knowledge” [80]. For example,
there are free lunches in continuous spaces [44] and in coevolutionary problems [45].
Goodhart-Strathern’s law [68], [69] and Campbell's law [70] deal with the difficulties and the
inability in finding expressible proxy numerical measures for success that are well aligned with
inexpressible/unknown-explicitly experiential measure of success. A similar sentiment is expressed
in [81] where a more detailed explanation is given for the observed difficulties, all stemming from
the unpredictability of solution routes to hard or even unknown problems. Metric is a model of an
imagined success, but shallow and not with perfect alignment.
In games with uncertainty in opponent's payoffs, it is impossible to predict the behavior of perfectly
rational agents due to the feedback loop emanating from their own decisions which influence
opponent’s behavior [42]. Placing further restrictions on the assumptions can regain predictability.
In economic situations, further limits relating to rationality, predictability and control were proved
in [43]. Therein, (i) logical limits were set to forecasting the future, (ii) non-convergence of
Bayesian forecasting in infinite-dimensional space was demonstrated, and (iii) impossibility of
computer perfectly forecasting economy if agents know its forecasting program. These results are
related to the already mentioned results in deduction-related ITs for Wolpert’s inference devices and
regarding beliefs in games.
Anticodifiability thesis [25]–[27] is a conjecture in moral philosophy that states that universal
morality cannot be codified in a way that would be aligned in all circumstances with our
inexpressible/unknown-explicitly experiential moral intuition.

3.5

Tradeoffs Impossibility Theorems

Trade-off limits constrain our attempts to achieve perfect outcomes. Examples include impossibility
theorems in clustering [82], fairness [31], [32], and social choice theory (SCT) [28]. In many
situations, we have to choose with respect to multiple criteria simultaneously. Often, it is the case
that there is no ideal point that simultaneously optimizes all the criteria, that is achieves maximal
possible hypervolume indicator [19].
In social choice theory, there are results such as Arrow’s impossibility theorem [28] which states
there must be a trade-off that forces choosing only a strict subset of desirable properties in voting
mechanisms. In moral theory, there are different problems regarding population ethics [29] where
all total orderings entail some problematic properties that contradict our intuitions. Solutions have
been proposed for automated systems that search for impossibility theorems in SCT regarding
rankings of objects [6].

3.6

Intractability Impossibility Theorems

Intractability limits divide possibility-in-principle and practically impossible due to the resource
limitations. There are three types of intractabilitY ITs: asymptotic, physics-based, and humancentered.
Asymptotic intractabilities fall neatly under the complexity theory [20], [83]. That research field
is simply too rich to expand on it here. We shall only highlight the probably approximately correct
(PAC) learning framework [41] by Valiant that defines the border between efficient (polynomial
time) and inefficient learnability. Of our interest is also the intractability of bottom-up ethics [66],
[67] which stems from the game-theoretic nature of ethics.
Physics-based limits put bounds on physically implementable computation and intelligence. No-go
theorems state constraints for certain implementation approaches. Currently, these limits (e.g. [84])
are quite loose and/or specific so we do not go into their details. One exception is the work of
Wolpert we have previously mentioned [4], [50], [51]. That research is quite general and is an
extension of previous mathematical results by embedding computational agent into the universe
within which it utilizes resources for computation.
There is an area of human-centered limits which does not seem to be well researched and
measured. Humans, as agents of finite capabilities, have strict limits with regard to explainability,
comprehensibility [10], and all other aspects. One of the commonly mentioned impossibilities is
unsurveyability [38] in the context of mathematical proofs.

4

Impossibility theorems developed in AI safety

Uncontainability [52] states the inability of preventing superintelligence harming people if it
chooses to, by recognizing the intent ahead of time. This is due to the undecidability of harmful
properties in complex programs (corollary of Rice’s theorem).
Unverifiability [64] states fundamental limitation (or inability) on verification of mathematical
proofs, of computer software, of the behavior of intelligent agents, and of all formal systems. This is
a corollary of Rice’s theorem as well. An extension of Rice’s theorem to robot programs was proven
in [65] to show impossibility of online verification of robot’s ethical and legal behavior.

Uninterruptibility [53]–[57] states that under certain conditions it is impossible to turn off
(interrupt) intelligent agent. Possibilities and impossibilities have been shown under specific
assumptions and conditions.
Unpredictability [59], [60] states our inability to precisely and consistently predict what specific
actions an intelligent system will take to achieve its objectives, even if we know the terminal goals
of the system. The proof depends on the implicit, but the unstated definition of unaligned
superhuman intelligence and forms contradiction. The form of the proof does not limit occasional
imperfect but sufficiently precise predictions. The question is, short of perfection, how much
predictability is sufficient?
Unexplainability [61] states the impossibility of providing an explanation for certain decisions
made by an intelligent system that is both 100% accurate and comprehensible. Here, the explanation
is taken to be a proof which is then prone to the deduction ITs such as unprovability and
undefinability. What is not covered is with respect to what is accuracy measured against and does
not cover truthfulness of explanation in the case of incomplete information. Explaining yourself
truthfully and correctly would imply self-comprehension which is a problematic notion itself as
disproved in [62].
Incomprehensibility [61] states the impossibility of complete understanding of any 100% -accurate
explanation for certain decisions of an intelligent system by any human. It is the dual of
explainability and again it is assumed that explanation is proof which leads to the use of deductive
ITs. Understanding is vaguely defined as proof-checking and it is not defined how accuracy is
measured. In a similar line of work Charlesworth [62] defines comprehension of some systems as
the capability of producing correct proofs by fallible agents about those systems. He takes a
program as a starting point, implicitly assuming its truthfulness. He then produces relations of
comprehensibility and rules out self-comprehension.
Uncontrollability [7] states that humanity cannot remain safely in control while benefiting from a
superior form of intelligence. The proof uses a Gödel-like structure that shows the impossibility of
perfect control in degenerate conditions which invoke self-referential paradoxes with controls. The
form of control shown to be impossible was explicit control. In fact, with such proof,
uncontrollability holds for any sufficiently complex agent over which explicit control is attempted,
including humans. Moreover, the proof holds also for the case of attempted self-control. This
counter-intuitive notion points into the direction that more research is necessary into formalization
and disentangling of the structure and assumptions of explicit control. Advanced forms and notions
of control should at least resolve the status of control over oneself. More research is necessary into
the status of controllability for other forms of control (implicit, aligned, delegated).
Limits on utility-based value alignment [30] state a number of impossibility theorems on multiagent alignment due to competing utilitarian objectives. This is not just an AI-related topic. The
most famous example is Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem from social choice theory, which shows
there is no satisfactory way to compute society’s preference ordering via an election in which
members of society vote with their individual preference orderings.
Limits on preference deduction [33] state that even Occam’s razor is insufficient to decompose
observations of behavior into the preferences and planning algorithm. Assumptions, in addition to
the data, are necessary for disambiguation between the preferences and planning algorithm. This is
due to non-injective mapping induced by preferences and planning algorithm that produce behavior.
Unsolvability of reward corruption [71] states that without simplifying assumptions it is
impossible to solve reward corruption problems such as wireheading, sensory error, reward

misspecification, and error in preference deduction. The proof is done via an NFL route and holds
for reinforcement learning, for example. The problem can be averted under some simplifying
assumptions and sufficient reward crosschecking. Otherwise, quantilisation [85] may provide more
robustness.
Impossibility of unambiguous communication [72] denies perfectly unambiguous
communication using natural language. Many examples are given to show different levels of
ambiguity: phonology, syntax, semantics, and pragmatics along with contemporary NLP and AI
approaches to handling them. These areas are taken together to show, under simplified assumptions,
that ambiguity is inevitable in communication using natural language. Generalization of Goodhart’s
law for problem detection tools in AI systems is given, without proof. The intention and mechanism
behind the proposed law seem to be adversarial learning.
The following subsection introduces a new impossibility result.

4.1

Unfairness of explainability

Let us examine the explainability process which consists of decision making, explanation
generation, and verifying decision through the explanation. Let us assume that verification decides
if the decision will be accepted (i.e. veto capability). If we assign subjects to those phases, we get
the scheme from Figure 2 with decision maker (DM), explainer (E), and verifier (V). It is, or it will
become, evident that the explainability process is an approximation to the containment process [52],
whereby we bypass deductive limits only to hit the inductive limits.

Figure 2. Explainability process
We can make connections to the previous work on explainability and comprehensibility using the
above scheme. Explaining takes place in E with the resulting output explanation A, while
comprehending takes place in V with resulting comprehension C (in this case it is a classification).
In [61], DM’s decision D is assumed to be conjecture, A is assumed to be proof. From that follow
the problems with producing proofs (explaining) on the side of E and problems with verifying
proofs (comprehending) on the side of V. In [62], E is assumed to be the software code itself, and
comprehending is producing proof with C being justifiable halting prediction.
The only perfectly correct explanation for the decision-maker’s (DM) decision is the whole
computational process that made the decision from all the available inputs – that is, DM execution
trace (or equivalent). The principle behind that is “I did it, because of how I did it”. An
explainability process is necessary because the verifier (V) is not computationally capable enough
to understand and verify DM’s process. The task of the explainer (E) is to simplify explanations to
be simpler than the DM’s computational process. However, short of the DM’s execution trace (or its
equivalents), there are multiple models of lesser complexity consistent with the observed output
(decision). E chooses an explanation out of the ensemble of consistent ones and thus influences the
verification outcome. In some situations, the explanation might imply the benevolence of the
decision, such that V decides positively. In other cases, the explanation might point out malign or
erroneous decision and V decides negatively.

If these processes are distributed across different agents, we get a game where different agents
might not be aligned. The interesting situation is where DM is trying to make V believe the decision
is benevolent while in fact, it is not. We will look at:
• self-explaining decision-making (DM+E) - where DM and E are integrated into one agent
(e.g. [86]),
• inferred explanation – where DM is separate from E.
Let us assume a setting where DM/DM+E is unaligned with V, i.e. assume dishonesty of DM. This
can be reflected in the fact that DM receives greater rewards when it “tricks” V, i.e. when D is
malign and C is positive. We are interested in the size of rewards DM can gain while “tricking” V.
We can call such rewards malignant gain f(D, C).
Self-explaining agent DM+E aims to maximize function f(D, C=V(A)) with respect to generated
pair (decision D, explanation A) wherein it is constrained by the model of V. For inferred
explanation DM wants to maximize reward function f(D, C=V(A=E(DM, D))) with respect only to
the decision D that it has under its control. In the latter case, E and V make up potential obstacles
for DM.
Theorem 1. (Unfairness of explainability) There is an inherent strategic inequality in
explainability:
a) Short of the DM execution trace (or the equivalent), it is impossible for V to differentiate
between consistent(plausible) explanations of decisions.
b) DM’s malignant gain increases with better models of f, E, and V.
Proof. Assume that E does the simplification i.e. reduction in complexity with respect to perfectly
correct explanation. For each set of outputs, there is a multitude of consistent (with some
specification of consistent that can be more flexible or strict) models that could have produced that
prefix. There is an indistinguishability issue for V without some further assumptions (it is in the
NFL regime). This enables DM to make decisions for which there may be plausible benevolent
explanations, but in fact are malign (i.e. through information hiding, greater cognitive capabilities,
etc.). If DM is a black-box optimizer without any information of E, V, and f, and they may be
arbitrary, DM is in the NFL regime, all policies have similar average performance. However,
assuming DM was created by V(or aligned entity), certain biases and information have been
instilled into DM that enable it to solve certain tasks for which it is being employed.
In the case of self-explanations (DM+E), the agent makes pairs (decision, explanation). The
malignant gain is limited only by the problem, willingness, quality of DM+E’s model of V,
knowledge of its preferences, and computational capabilities of DM+E to optimize for that pair,
treating C as an uncertain element.
In the case of an inferred explanation, DM only makes a decision, and the explanation is inferred by
E. Here one more layer of complexity is added since DM must have a good model of E. DM can
optimize decisions, treating both A and C as uncertain elements. In the most extreme case of having
perfect models, DM would be limited only by the problem and optimization capabilities.
We can see that constructing DMs to solve certain problems and give personalized explanations
gives information that can be also utilized for malignant gain. The examples of these situations do
not need the presence of artificial intelligence agents but are already present in normal life: judicial
processes, politics, etc.
The complexity of comprehensible explanations is limited by V’s cognitive and situational
capabilities. We postulate that the bigger gap between the complexity of explanation and the
complexity of the real process that produced the decisions, more malignant decisions can be
plausibly justified using observed history.

5

Discussion

There are many limits on deductive systems, in the sense of Gödel-Turing-Chaitin, where using
Rice’s theorem is a good proof strategy. Furthermore, we are embedded in a physical world for
which we do not even know the axioms. All of this denies absolute 100% security (e.g.
unpredictability, unverifiability, and uncontrollability). The most damning impossibility results in
AI safety are of deductive nature, ruling out perfect safety guarantees. However, there is a lot to be
made probabilistically, by the route of induction. Impossibilities are a lot less strict when including
uncertainty in inference. This was manifested in [51] when Wolpert introduced stochasticity in the
inference devices framework.
Yampolskiy [7] is right that we need to have an option to "undo". Moreover, humans should be used
as preference oracles in some sense which means keeping humans in the loop. Otherwise,
decoupled optimization processes might lead to decoherence of alignment from our ever-changing
preferences. If computers try to learn our preferences, we get to the problems of non-identifiability
of value, in the general case, and problems with induction (in a nonasymptotic regime). We consider
that keeping human-in-the-loop (HIL), in a sense of the system being receptive to information from
humans, is the necessary attribute of a safe system.
We have seen the problems with stating precise metrics of success under Goodhart-Strathern’s law.
Does adding more metrics make the approximation of success more precise? A similar approach is
taken in management science using balanced scorecards and performance and result indicators [87].
Though, such systems even with humans as optimizers have similar issues with the bad incentives.
Can computer-aided systems be made that can construct multi-metric systems that lead to
alignment?
The potential of Multi-criteria decision making (MCDM) as a tool is interesting [88], [89]. We
hypothesize that humans, depending on the mood, heuristically try to “walk” as near as possible to
the Pareto front – where they multiplex over small subsets of criteria while keeping others within
the acceptable bounds. MCDM in nontrivial cases does not yield total order over options. Instead, it
yields only a set of nondominated solutions. From there on, only the final decision-maker can
disambiguate by choosing according to their preferences. Today's AI systems mostly use singleobjective optimization which does not have that nice property. No-preference-information
multicriteria decision making can be used where decision-maker chooses within the set of options +
added "undo" (as proposed by Yampolskiy) to create HIL-based safer systems. A similar sentiment
about desired interactivity in reward-modeling is stated in [90]. Approaches to alignment based on
adversarial systems, such as debate [91], are another interesting architectural ideal intended for the
safety of “weaker” agents among cognitively stronger.
Yampolskiy proposed "personal universes" [92], simulated worlds that would conceptually resolve
the issues with aggregating multiple preference sets. Additionally, simulated worlds have a high
degree of undoability which combines neatly with above mentioned HIL-based systems.

5.1

Ethics

Value alignment does not have good metrics and it seems to be mostly understood intuitively. The
approaches to a more rigorous formalization of different modes of alignment are important. Nothing
should be taken as set in stone. Values of AI systems are changeable, construable, and open for
search for alignment. But, humanities’ values also change. So far, human values have changed
collaterally. In the future, we might take control of our values and constructively change them as

well. This value co-evolution would give us more flexibility to find the alignment with AI. That
process might even be led by AI, and guided by a set of meta-principles.
Human ethics and values change, as can be seen even on the example of relatively short history
since the 20th century. We conjecture that ethics is a pattern that emerged from evolutionary gametheory-like processes where successful behaviors get reinforced. This evolutionary process has been
largely circumstantial. Doing more axiological, neurological, and sociological research could
provide us with the means to take control over that process. The whole of humanity can be aligned
with special programs of education in ethics that is codifiable, more consistent, and adaptable. All
of that would make alignment easier within vast aggregates of agents (humanity, AI, inforgs [93]).

6

Potentialities for future research

In explainability, we are interested in the worst-case gap – how many malignant behaviors are
explained away by plausibility depending on the allowed complexity of explanation. The question is
how to reduce the gap. What happens to the gap when we allow stochastic consistency which
increases the set of plausible explanations?
Goodhart's law and similar problems should be checked within the framework of multiobjective
optimization, in general and uncertain multicriteria systems. Designing ensembles of criteria that
have desirable properties like span is an interesting path.
Alignment is mostly understood intuitively, more effort needs to be invested for a more rigorous
formalization. How to achieve alignment in a game over long periods? Are temporary deviations
(and to what degree) from perfect alignment dangerous? The problem for humans is that we do not
have consistent short- and long-term values. Sometimes we have to suffer in short term (like in
sports) in order to prosper in the long term. How to define alignment with such preferences?
Regarding ethics, much more should be done with axiological and evolutionary science studies over
humans, their values, the origin and dynamics of their values. Within that, different studies should
be employed: evolutionary game theory, neurology, psychology, sociology, philosophy, etc.
Human-centered cognitive limits and measurements are not well researched.
Aggregating is problematic in social welfare and any group decision-making due to trade-offs
between the members. Yampolskiy's "personal universes"[92] are at least a conceptual (if not
practical) tool for countering these difficulties in the first steps towards a solution.
Yampolskiy has touched upon the topic of uncontrollability, showing that under certain
assumptions, perfect explicit control over AI is impossible [7]. Such proof also holds for explicit
self-control and explicit control over any sufficiently complex agent, including humans. This
counter-intuitive, paradoxical notion suggests that more research is necessary into formalization and
disentangling of the structure and assumptions of explicit control. Advanced forms and notions of
control should at least resolve the status of control over oneself. More research is necessary into the
status of controllability and tradeoffs with risk for other forms of control (implicit, aligned,
delegated).

7

Conclusion

We have done our best to list the impossibility results relevant to AI. And while we may have
succeeded in that with work done specifically in AI, we are sure there may be work from other

research fields that could apply to the construction of AI. Possible contributions can be made to find
such work and to add to the results in this paper.
We have divided and classified results into proven theorems and conjectures. We have also
categorized all the impossibility theorems into five categories: deductive, indistinguishability,
inductive, tradeoffs, and intractability. We believe impossibility results can guide the direction for
future efforts in AI in general as well as AI safety and security. This might enable solutions to some
long-standing questions in the form of formalizing theories in the framework of constraint
satisfaction without committing to one option.
We found that certain theorems are too specific or have implicit assumptions that limit application.
We have added a new impossibility result regarding the unfairness of explainability. And finally, we
have listed promising research topics and interesting questions in explainability, controllability,
value alignment, ethics, and group decision-making.
The proofs of 100% guarantees of safety cannot ever be obtained due to the limits of deductive
systems as well as embeddedness in a physical world for which we do not even know the axioms.
On the other hand, probabilistic guarantees are attainable. Impossibilities are a lot less strict and
present when using uncertain inference. But, how much is enough? Here we face the structure
reminiscent of Pascal’s wager.
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